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Abstract—Developments in communication technologies 
especially in wireless have enabled the progress of low-cost and low-
power wireless sensor networks (WSNs). The features of such WSN 
are holding minimal energy, weak computational capabilities, 
wireless communication and an open-medium nature where sensors 
are deployed. WSN is underpinned by application driven such as 
military applications, the health sector, etc. Due to the intrinsic nature 
of the network and application scenario, WSNs are vulnerable to 
many attacks externally and internally. In this paper we have focused 
on the types of internal attacks of WSNs based on OSI model and 
discussed some security requirements, characterizers and challenges 
of WSNs, by which to contribute to the WSN’s security research. 
 
Keywords—Wireless sensor network, internal attacks, security, 
OSI model.   
I. INTRODUCTION 
IRELESS sensor network (WSN) is underpinned by an 
application driven technology for information gathering 
and processing which consists of many resource-constrained 
sensor nodes. It can be used for many different applications 
range military implementations in the battlefield, 
environmental monitoring, in health sectors as well as 
emergency responses and various surveillances. Due to WSNs’ 
natures such as low-cost, low power, open media, and 
multifunctional nodes that communicate at short distances 
through wireless links, etc. they have become one part of our 
daily life and drawn great attentions to those people who are 
working in this area. A typical WSN is shown in Figure 1.  
  
Fig. 1 A typical WSN [1] 
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In order to assure the functionality of a WSN, especially in 
malicious environments, security mechanisms become 
essential for all kinds of sensor networks. However, the 
resource constrains in the sensor nodes of a WSN and 
multihop communications in open wireless channel make the 
security of WSN even more heavy challenge. Since sensor 
nodes can (or have to) also be deployed in the hostile 
environment without any temper resistant protection. The 
nodes deployed in a network are relatively easy to be 
compromised, which is the case that the nodes are out of the 
system control and an adversary can easily get full access to 
those nodes.  Hence, all the data could be modified and 
restored in those targeted nodes, including the cryptographic 
keys. Thus, developing new security mechanisms are necessary 
as the nodes under traditional security mechanisms based on 
conventional authentication become inefficient and an 
adversary is able to lunch attacks with a legitimate status of the 
network [2].  The node is called compromised node when an 
attacker gain a control of the node and appears as a legitimate 
node, after a network deployment done.  
Though overall security is very important issue in any WSN, 
but very little work has been done to a secure WSN internally. 
In order to work on the internal security, researchers need to 
realize its features and different types of internal attacks. One 
of focuses of this paper is to give an overview different 
internal attack of a WSN based on the Open System 
Interconnect (OSI) model.  
The following paper is organized as follows: section 2 is 
comprised of the overview of the generic security requirements 
for an WSN followed by vital security challenges in section 3. 
Section 4 covers the details of nature and the types of internal 
attacks followed by conclusion in section 5. 
II. GENERIC SECURITY REQUIREMENTS IN A WSN 
The nature of a WSN leads a challenge to provide full 
security to the network. The ultimate security requirement is to 
provide confidentiality, integrity, authenticity, and availability 
of all messages in the presence of resourceful adversaries. In 
order to provide the complete security in a WSN all message 
have to be encrypted and authenticated.  An adversary can use 
natural impairments to modify the original message or 
information as well as can make the information   unavailable 
because of WSN nature and uncontrolled environments.  
Security requirements in a WSN are similar to the wireless ad 
hoc network [3]. WSNs have the general security requirements 
of data confidentiality, authentication, integrity, freshness and 
secure management. 
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Confidentiality: an adversary can choose any node to 
eavesdrop as long as it is within the radio range as the signals 
are transmitted over the wireless channel. So, it is a threat for 
the data confidentiality as the attacker can gain the 
cryptographic information.  
Authentication: to determine the legitimate node and 
whether the received data has come from the authorized node 
or not authentication is important.  
Integrity: information moving through the network could be 
altered. So integrity is important to trust the received 
information from the network. 
Freshness: to save the network from the replay packets it is 
important to ensure that the received data is fresh and unused. 
Secure management: it is important to manage the 
distribution of cryptographic keying material in the network.   
III. VITAL CHALLENGES FOR WSN SECURITY 
A WSN has three major properties that made the security 
mechanism challenging. 
a. Resource Constraints 
b. Operational Environment, and 
c. Wireless Multihop Communication. 
It is commonly assumed that sensor nodes are highly 
resource constrained; e.g., the resources are comparable to the 
Berkeley MICA2 motes and TMote mini is presented in the 
Table I Thus, security protocols for WSNs must be executable 
on the available hardware and especially must be very efficient 
in terms of energy consumption and execution time. 
 
TABLE I 
 EXISTING SENSOR PLATFORM [4], [5] 
Characteristics Mica2 TMote mini 
RAM (Kbytes) 4 10 
Program Flesh 
Memory (Kbytes) 
128 48 
Maximum data rate 
(Kbps) 
76.8 250 
Power Draw: 
Receive (mW) 
36.81 57 
Power Draw: 
Transmit (mW) 
87.90 57 
Power Draw: sleep 
(mW) 
0.048 0.003 
 
The operational environment of most WSNs is assumed to 
be unattended or even hostile. Since sensor nodes are usually 
not assumed to be physically protected by some tamper-
resistant hardware, an adversary is able to compromise sensor 
nodes. Thus, even if security mechanisms, such as node-based 
authentication, are deployed, an adversary is able to participate 
in the network since he has access to all data [6], e.g., 
cryptographic keys stored on the node. Thus, security 
protocols must be able to operate even if sensor nodes are 
compromised. 
 
The wireless communication enables an adversary to 
eavesdrop, inject, drop, or alter messages or to perform  denial 
of service (DoS) attacks by jamming the wireless channel. In 
contrast to most other wireless networks, the communication is 
performed in a multihop way. This introduces additional 
challenges. Compromised nodes may be part of a route, 
enabling them to modify forwarded messages, or a 
compromised node injects a large amount of false messages to 
drain the energy resources of all forwarding nodes. 
IV. NATURES AND TYPES OF INTERNAL ATTACKS 
Wireless network transmission medium has broadcast nature 
because of this characteristic of the network; it is more 
susceptible to the security attack compare to the traditional 
wired network. In wireless sensor network nodes can be 
deployed randomly in the hostile environment an adversary 
can easily to make an attack to the targeted wireless sensor 
network (WSN) [7].  Regarding to the security of a WSN, it 
can be investigated in different perspectives, for example 
WSN attacks can be classified as two major categories: 
passive and active attack, or an attack can be identified as 
external and internal attack according to the domain of attacks 
[8]. Sometimes both reviews are applied, such as “internal 
active attack,” “internal passive attack,” etc. will be used to 
highlight the type of an attack. In this research paper, we 
focused on the internal attacks of WSN. In order to clarify all 
those mentioned terminologies the definitions are as follows 
[7], [8]: 
Passive attack: The attack does not have any direct effect on 
the network as it is outside of the network. Passive attacks are 
in the nature of eavesdropping on, or monitoring of packets 
exchanged within a WSN. 
Active Attack: the attacker transmits data to one or both of 
the nodes, or chunk the data stream in one or both directions in 
the communication channel. Active attackers can disrupt the 
normal functionality of the whole network, which means it 
may change the information, may modify the original data, or 
can gather falsehood data. Its behavior likes a legitimate node 
in the network. 
External attack: The attack is defined as the attack does not 
belong to the network and it does not have any internal 
information about the network such as cryptographic 
information. In other word it can be defined as physical attack. 
Internal attack: When a legitimate node of the network act 
abnormally or illicit way it is consider as an internal attack. It 
uses the compromised node to attack the network which can 
destroy or disrupt the network easily.  
The compromised node holds the following characteristics 
[9]: 
• It usually runs some malicious code that is different from 
the code running on a legitimate node and seeks to steal 
information from the sensor network or disrupt its normal 
function. 
• Node uses the same radio frequency as the other normal 
sensor nodes so that it can communicate with them. 
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• Node is authenticated and participates in the sensor 
network. Since secure communication in sensor networks is 
encrypted and authenticated using cryptographic keys, 
compromised nodes with the secret keys of a legitimate node 
can participate in the secret and authenticated communication 
of the network. 
It is obviously that the compromised nodes are more 
dangerous as the adversary can easily obtain the access 
information from the cryptographic information and then to 
make further attacks with the trust of other sensors. This type 
of attack is difficult to break or stop. That is why it has 
become a challenging task to secure WSN from internal 
attack.In many applications, the data obtained by the sensing 
nodes needs to be kept confidential and it has to be authentic. 
In the absence of security a false or malicious node could 
intercept private information, or could send false messages to 
nodes in the network. The major attacks are: Denial of Service 
(DOS), Worm hole attack, Sinkhole attack, Sybil attack, 
Selective Forwarding attack, Spoofed and Altered, or 
Replayed routing information, Hello flood attack, flooding 
attack. Based on the Opes System Interconnect (OSI) model 
the attack can be tabulated in table II [10]: 
 
TABLE II 
LAYER BASED SECURITY ATTACKS [11] 
Layer Attacks 
Physical layer Jamming, Tampering, Sybil 
Attack 
Data Link Layer Collision, Sybil Attack, 
Spoofing and Altering Routing 
Attack, Replay attack 
Network Layer Internet smart attack, Sybil 
Attack, Blackhole Attack, 
Spoofing and Altering Routing 
Attack, wormhole attack, 
selective forwarding attack, 
Hello Flood Attack. 
Transport Layer Flooding Attack, 
Desynchronisation 
Application Spoofing and Altering 
Routing Attack, False Data 
Injection, 
 
A. Denial of Service (DoS) attacks 
Denial of service attack is an explicit attempt to prevent the 
legitimate user of a service or data. The common method of 
attack involves overloading the target system with requests, 
such that it cannot respond to legitimate traffic. As a result, it 
makes the system or service unavailable for the user. The basic 
types of attack are: Jamming, Tapering, collision, Homing, 
flooding, etc.  If the sensor network encounters DoS attacks, 
the attack gradually reduces the functionality as well as the 
overall performance of the wireless sensor network. Projected 
use of sensor networks in sensitive and critical applications 
makes the prospect of DoS attacks even more alarming. In 
WSN several types of Dos Can be performed in different 
layers which tabulated in the table 3 [10] 
 
TABLE III 
LAYER BASED DOS ATTACK [12] 
Layer Attacks 
Physical layer Jamming, Tampering 
Data Link Layer Collision, Exhaustion 
Network Layer Misdirection 
Transport Layer Desynchronisation 
Application Layer Path Based DoS 
 
The discussed attacks are linking some terminologies that 
are defined as follows [11], [12]:  
Jamming: Jamming is a popular Denial of Service (DOS) 
attack. In this attack the attacker attempts to jam the 
frequencies of the radio used for communication between the 
nodes in the network. In this attack, an adversary may use e 
few nodes in strategic positions to effectively jam most of the 
communications inside the network. In essence, an attacker 
needs only a few nodes in order to disseminate a large 
network. 
Tampering: Because of the nature of wireless sensor 
networks, an adversary could easily get physical access to the 
sensor nodes. This may enable an attacker to compromise 
sensor nodes in a DOS like manner 
Collision: This is a DOS attack, where a node induces a 
collision in some small part of a transmitted packet. The 
packet will then fail the checksum check, because of the 
changes brought on by the collision, and the receiver node will 
then ask for a retransmission of the packet. 
Exhaustion: This attack is a collision attack taken a bit 
further. A malicious node may conduct a collision attack 
repeatedly in order to exhaust the power supply of the 
communicating nodes. 
Misdirection: In this attack a malicious node, that is part of 
a route, can instead of dropping packets, quite simply send 
them on a different path where there does not exist a route to 
the destination. The malicious node can do this for certain 
packets, or all packets. 
Desynchronisation: it can disrupt an existing connection 
between two end points. Adversary transmits forget packet 
with bogus sequence number or control flag to degrade or 
prevent the exchange of data.   
Path based DoS: An adversary overwhelms sensor nodes by 
flooding a multihope end to end communication path with 
either replayed or injected false message to injected false 
message to waste secure energy resources. 
B. Wormhole attack 
Just like the theoretical wormholes in space, this attacker 
can send packets, routing information, ACK etc, through a link 
outside the network to another node somewhere else in the 
same network. This way an attacker can fool nodes into 
thinking they are neighbours, when they are actually in 
different parts of the network. This can also confuse routing 
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mechanisms that rely on knowing distances between nodes. A 
wormhole attack can be used as a base for eaves dropping, not 
forwarding packets in a DOS like manner, alter information in 
packets before forwarding them etc. 
C. Sinkhole attack 
This is a DOS attack, where a malicious node advertises a 
zero cost route through itself. If the routing protocol in the 
network is a “low cost route first “protocol, like distance 
vector, other nodes will chose this node as an intermediate 
node in routing paths. The neighbours of this node will also 
chose this node in routes, and compete for the bandwidth. This 
way the malicious node creates a black hole inside the 
network. 
D. Sybil attack 
The Sybil attack targets fault tolerant schemes such as 
distributed storage, dispersity, multipath routing and topology 
maintenance. This is done by having a malicious node present 
multiple identities to the network. This attack is especially 
confusing to geographic routing protocols as the adversary 
appears to be in multiple locations at once 
E. Selective forwarding attack 
In this attack, malicious nodes can decide not to forward 
packets of certain types or to from certain nodes. Even though 
the protocol is completely resistant to the sinkholes, 
wormholes, and the Sybil attack, a compromised node has a 
significant probability of including itself on a data flow to 
launch this type of attack if it is strategically located near the 
source or a base station.  
F. Spoofing attack 
In this attack, a malicious node may be able to create 
routing loops, wormholes, black holes, partition the network 
and etc., by spoofing, altering or replaying routing 
information. 
G. Hello flood attack 
Many protocols require nodes to broadcast HELLO packets 
to announce themselves to their neighbours. A node receiving 
such a packet may assume that it is within the radio range of 
the sender but this assumption may be false.  
H. Flooding attack 
In this attack, a malicious node may send continuous 
connection requests to a victim node effectively flooding the 
victim’s network link 
 
All of the above mentioned attacks has the common purpose 
that is to compromise the integrity or workability of the 
network that they attack. In order to make the network function 
the network need to saved internally and externally. This work 
will give a understanding the internal attacks of WSN to the 
researchers.   
 
V. CONCLUSION 
Provisioning internal security is a significant task in WSN. 
In this paper we have presented a foundation of OSI layer 
based internal attacks of WSN. This will lead the researchers 
to develop the resilient security mechanism by considering 
internal attacks induced in WSN.  
REFERENCES   
[1] X, Huang, M, Ahmed, D, Sharma, “The node became compromised 
when an attacker gain control of the node that acts as a legitimate node, 
after network deployment”, 2011 Ninth IEEE/IFIP International 
Conference on Embedded and Ubiquitous Computing. October 2011 
Melbourne, Australia 
[2] Y. Zhou, Y. Fang, and Y. Zhang, “Securing wireless sensor networks: a 
survey,” IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials, 3rd Quarter 2008. 
[3] K. Lu et al., "A Framework for a Distributed Key Management Scheme 
in Heterogeneous Wireless Sensor Networks", IEEE Transactions on 
Wireless Communications, vol. 7, no. 2, Feb. 2008, pp. 639-647. 
[4] https://www.eol.ucar.edu/rtf/facilities/isa/internal/CrossBow/DataSheets 
/mica2.pdf, [accessed on November 24, 2011] 
[5] http://sentilla.com/files/pdf/eol/Tmote_Mini_Datasheet.pdf, [accessed 
on November 24, 2011]. 
[6] O. E. Ochirkhand, M. Marine, V. Fabrice and K. Apostotlos, 
“Resiliency of Wireless Sensor Networks: Definitions and Analyses”, 
17th international conference on Telecommunications 2010.  
[7] S. K. Singh, M. P. Singh, and D. K. Singh, “A Survey on Network 
Security and Attack Defense Mechanism For Wireless Sensor 
Networks”, International Journal of Computer Trends and Technology- 
May to June Issue 2011 
[8] T. G. Lupu “Main Types of Attacks in Wireless Sensor Networks” 
International Conference in Recent Advances in Signals and Systems  
2009, ISSN: 1790-5109, ISBN: 978-960-474- 114-4. 
[9] M.Y. Hsieh, Y. M. Huang, “Adaptive Security Modules in Increment-
ally Deployed Sensor Networks”, International Journal on Smart 
Sensing and Intelligent Systems, vol. 1, no. 1, March 2008 
[10] K. Sharma, M. K. Gosh, “Wireless Sensor Networks: An Overview on 
its Security Threats”, IJCA Special Issue on Mobile Ad-hoc Networks 
MANETs, 2010. 
[11] H. K. D. Sharma, A. Kar, “Security Threats in Wireless Sensor 
Networks”, Carnahan Conferences Security Technology, Proceedings 
2006 40th Annual IEEE International.  
[12] H. Ghamgin, M. S. Akhger, M. T. Jafari, Z. Branch, “Attackes in 
wireless sensor networks”, Australian journal of Basic and applied 
Sciences, 2011. 
World Academy of Science, Engineering and Technology
International Journal of Electronics and Communication Engineering
 Vol:6, No:2, 2012 
206International Scholarly and Scientific Research & Innovation 6(2) 2012 ISNI:0000000091950263
O
pe
n 
Sc
ie
nc
e 
In
de
x,
 E
le
ct
ro
ni
cs
 a
nd
 C
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
En
gi
ne
er
in
g 
V
ol
:6
, N
o:
2,
 2
01
2 
w
as
et
.o
rg
/P
ub
lic
at
io
n/
11
04
3
